The creation ofthe euro will link an economy that is nearly as large and as open as the United States. Does this imply that the euro will rival the role of the dollar as an international currency? This paper addressesthis question through an examination ofthe determinants ofthe use of an international currency. It examines both the prospects of the euro becoming an international currency and the implications for the European Union and the United States.
Introduction
The final stage in the creation of the European economic and monetary union (EMU) will entail the replacement of the national currencies of the member states with a single currency --the euro. This event, which is unparalleled historically, is likely to produce the greatest potential rival to the dollar in international currency markets since the dollar deposed the pound as the pre-eminent international currency. This paper examines the potential role of the euro as international currency through an analysis ofthe functions of an international currency.
Economists define money as anything which serves the following three functions: a unit of account, a store of value and a medium of exchange. To operate as a unit of account, prices must be set in terms of the money. To function as a store of value, the purchasing power of money must not deteriorate over time.' To function as a medium of exchange, the money must be used forpurchasing goods and services. Clearly, an international money must also serve these three functions. For an international currency, one used outside its country of issue, these functions are generally decomposed by sector of use --official and private, as in TableÃ currency serves as an international currency forofficial purposes if it is used as an official exchange rate peg, if governments and/or central banks hold foreign exchange reserves in this currency, and if it is used as an intervention currency. An international currency for private transactions must function as an invoice currency, financial assets must be denominated in this This is the most difficult role for currency to achieve. Nevertheless it is a key function for determining if a currency will function as money. In countries experiencing hyperinflation there is both an increase in the use of barter and the use ofa foreign currency for transactions purposes.
currency and it must be used as a vehicle currency through which two other currencies are traded.
An international currency may also become a substitute currency for a domestic currency. In this case it serves all three functions: unit of account, store of value and medium of exchange.
Generally, a substitute currency is used when high inflation orpolitical instability eliminate the store of value fUnction ofthe domestic currency. The three functions of an international currency reinforce each other. For example, if a country pegs its exchange rate to another currency, it is likely to hold reserves in that currency and conduct its interventions in exchange markets in that currency. On the private side, the use of a currency for invoicing trade and holding financial assets increases the probability that the currency will be used as a vehicle currency. The use of a currency for international private transactions also reinforces its use in official transactions.
The use of a currency in the international exchange of goods, services and assets determines its role as a global currency. Thus, the larger and more open an economy is the more likely its currency is to circulate in international markets. Size and openness in part determine a country's share of global trade and are also important in determining the size of a country's capital markets.
The convertibility of a country's currency is another important determinant of its use in international markets. Restrictions on the ability to exchange a currency for other currencies will limit its global use. At the end of World War II almost every country, with the exception of the U.S., restricted the convertibility of its currency. This inconvertibility persisted for the first decade following the end ofthe war. The convertibility of the U.S. dollar prompted its use as the currency in which international trade was conducted. The overall strength and stability of the U.S. economy Were also important factors in promoting the dollar's use as an international currency.
The growth of the German and Japanese economies and the relative price stability achieved by these countries has prompted the use of their currencies in international markets. As a result, the overwhelming dominance the dollar held in international markets in the 1950s and l960s is diminishing. Nevertheless the dollar remains the most important international currency.
Partly this is due to the importance of inertia in determining trends in the use of currencies in international markets. For example, the pound sterling continued to play a major role as an international currency long after its dominance of the global economy had waned. The dominant position of the U.S. dollar as an international currency in the early post-war period has in part sustained its use as an international currency as its relative economic power has declined.
Another factor favoring the continued use of the U.S. dollar is the size, depth, and liquidity of U.S. financial markets relative to tt~ose in Germany and Japan.
The creation of the euro will be a major event in international financial history. If all the current members of the European Union join the EMU the single currency will link an economy that is nearly as large as the United States and significantly larger than the economy of Japan, see Table 2 . Likewise the share of world exports ofthe European Union (excluding intra-E.U. trade)
is only slightly below the share of the United States and more than double Japan's share. Do these factors imply that the euro will rival the role of the dollar as an international currency? This paper addresses this question through an examination ofthe recent trends in and the determinants ofthe use of international currencies foreach of the functions listed in Table 1 .
Furthermore, it considers the prospects that the euro will play a major role in each of the functions and examines the implications of these changes for both the European Union and the United States.
The Official Uses of an International Currency
Exchange Rate Peg
Countries that peg their exchange rate to another currency most often choose the U.S. dollar. At the end of 1975, fifty-two currencies were pegged to the dollar, as shown in Table 3 .
The French franc was the second most popular choice. 3 No currencies were pegged to the Deutsche mark orthe Japanese yen. Combining all ofthe currencies pegged to the currencies of the current members of the European Union still left the dollar as the predominant choice for an exchange rate peg. By the end of 1996, the number ofcurrencies pegged to the dollar had
The French franc is used as the currency peg for the member countries of the African Financial Community (CFA). declined to twenty-one. The French franc was still the second most popular choice, with the Deutsche mark far behind. The Japanese yen still was not used as a currency peg. The decline in the number of currencies tied to the dollar since 1975 is a result of a decline in the popularity of fixed exchange rates rather than a shift away from the dollar. None of the currencies that were tied to the dollar in 1975 have chosen another currency for a peg.
Moreover, while most countries no longer claim to peg their exchange rate many do limit the flexibility of their currencies against the dollar. Sixty-two countries explicitly limit the flexibility of their currencies against the dollar, far more than against any other currency. 4 (1996) .
The major factors which influence the choice of a currency for an exchange rate peg are the extent of a country's trade and financial links with the country whose currency is chosen for the peg. Countries that are heavily dependent on trade in commodities are likely to choose the dollar if they peg their exchange rate since most internationally traded commodities are priced in dollars. In choosing a currency peg the stability of the prospective peg is also important. A high inflation country may choose to peg its exchange rate as a means to restrict the growth rate of its money supply.
The creation ofthe euro is unlikely to cause countries that currently peg to the dollar to switch to the euro, with the possible exception of Lithuania. For the most part the countries whose currencies are pegged to the dollar are countries whose economies are linked to the U.S.
(countries in Latin America and the Caribbean) or oil exporting countries. Nevertheless, it is possible that a number of countries whose currencies are not currently pegged to European Union currencies may decide to peg their currencies to the euro. European Union countries that are not in the first wave of EMU are likely to peg theircurrencies to the euro, as are countries in the rest ofEurope who hope to become members of the European Union. It is less clear that European countries that are not currently prospective E.U. members, such as Switzerland and Norway will adopt a peg to the euro. The European Union is the major trading partner of these tw' countries.
It accounts for 77 percent of Norway's exports and 79 percent of Switzerland's exports.
Likewise, 71 percent of Norway's imports and 79 percent of Switzerland's imports come from the European Union. These trade links alone may not cause these countries to adopt a peg to the euro. Canada, for instance, which sends 83 percent of its exports to the United States, and receives 67 percent of its imports from the U.S. has not felt a need to peg its currency to the U.S.
dollar. 5
Any effect of the increase in the number of countries pegging their currencies to the euro relative to those pegging to the dollar on the European Union and the United States will occur through the effects of these pegs on the use of the euro and dollar in other functions. Countries, for example, that peg their currencies generally hold most of their foreign exchange reserves in the currency to which they are pegged.
Reserve Currency
In 1975 the dollar accounted for 79 percent of the foreign currency reserves held by the member countries of the International Monetary Fund. The Deutsche mark had a 6 percent share of foreign exchange reserves and the pound sterling had a 4 percent share. The combined share of the currencies ofthe current members ofthe European Union was 12 percent. 6 The yen accounted for only 0.5 percent of foreign currency reserves. In 1996 the dollar's share of international foreign currencyreserves had fallen to 64 percent, while the pound's share remained steady at 4 percent. In contrast, the shares for the mark and the yen had risen to 14 and 6 percent, respectively. The share of the European Union currencies rose to 20 percent.
Figures la-id show the shares of the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, the Deutsche mark, and the combined share of E.U. currencies in official holdings of foreign exchange since 1973.
Trade data are for 1996 and are from the IMF (1997). 6 The only E.U. currencies for which data are reported are the DM, the French franc, pound sterling and the Netherlands guilder. The determinants of the currency composition of reserves varies across developing and industrial countries 8 . In the former trade and financial links are important factors. Reserves remain important for financing imports in developing countries, whereas in industrial countries private markets generally fulfill this role. Thus, the currencies in which imports are invoiced in developing countries is a key determinant of the composition ofreserves. It was generally believed that the greater reserve diversification on the part of the developing countries was a result of the greater importance of reserves in financing trade. ' Most of the Deutsche mark reserves held by industrial countries are accounted forby the European Union countries. Data in Masson and Turtelboom (1997) indicate that the European Union countries held 69 percent of the Deutsche mark reserves held by industrial countries in 1995.
8 See Ben-Bassat (1980 , 1984 and Dooley et al (1989) .
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Reserves also are important for financing the foreign debt of developing countries. The currency composition ofthis debt will affect the currency composition of the demand for reserves. As shown in Table 4 , the long-term debt of developing countries is most commonly denominated in U.S. dollars. Moreover, the percent of developing country debt denominated in the currencies oT the European Union countries has declined sharply since the l970s.
Nevertheless, the dollar's share in the foreign currency reserves of developing countries outweighs its importance in financing debt. In both developing and industrial countries the exchange rate arrangement affects the currency composition of international reserves. Heller and Knight (1978) provided an early analysis of this effect. They showed that if a country pegged its exchange rate to a particular currency that currency's share in its reserves rose. Dooley et al (1989) argued that for industrial countries the exchange rate arrangement was the most important determinant of the composition of international reserves. In particular, countries with a flexible exchange rate had a high share of dollar reserves and a low share of Deutsche mark reserves. The importance of the exchange rate arrangement in determining the currency composition of a country's reserves is linked to the use of these reserves for intervening in the currency markets. This is discussed in the next section.
The riskãnd return on currencies is also a factor in determining the currency composition of reserves. Most reserves are held in the form of government securities. Thus, changes in the relative return on these securities in conjunction with the depreciation risk, particularly if sustained over a long-period may cause shifts in a country's composition ofreserves. In addition the liquidity of government securities markets is a factorin determining the choice of reserve currency since reserves may need to be sold quickly for intervention purposes.
Much of the focus on the effects ofthe creation of the euro on the composition of international reserves has been on changes in reserve holdings that will occur among the members of the EMU. Monetary union will have two effects on members reserves. First, any holdings of the currencies of the members ofthe monetary union will cease to be international reserves. This will reduce total reserves and increase (at least initially) the dollar's share in the international reserves ofthe EMU countries. Second, the pooling of reserves will result in a decline in the need for total reserves, as will th~reduction in the need for reserves for intervention purposes.
A recent study indicates that if all fifteen members ofthe European Union join EMU, total reserves of the member states will decline from $295.5 billion to $204.7 billion as a result of the elimination of the reserve status ofthe European Union currencies. 9 This reduction, as See Masson and Turtelboom (1997) .
noted above, will increase the dollar's share in the reserves of these countries. Even a further reduction in the foreign exchange reserves of the members of the monetary union will leave the dollar's share offoreign exchange reserves above its current share. Only through a diversification of the remaining reserves would the dollar's share fall.
For the euro to rival the dollar as an international reserve currency, non-EMU countries will have to significantly shift the portfolio composition of their reserves. While it is likely that other European countries may shift some of their reserves from dollars into euros, a pivotal shift in the worldwide composition of reserves will require majorchanges in the reserve composition on the part of Latin American and Asian countries. There is no evidence that such a large shift in reserves will follow from the creation of the euro. China for example, recently announced that it would not consider exchanging any of its dollar reserves for euro reserves until the euro had proven itself to be a "hard and stable currency after years of running".'°C ertainly as the euro's use an international medium of exchange rises, countries are likely to increase their holding of euro reserves. These actions will lead to gradual rather than sharp shifts in the composition of reserves." This point is also made by Johnson (1994) who argues that as long as the Federal Reserve achieves an acceptable degree of price stability in the United States, changes in reserve holdings will remain gradual.
The implications of a diversification of international reserves away from the U.S. dollar and toward the euro depend on the speed at which such a change would occur. A massive sale of dollars by central banks and purchase ofeuros would cause a sharp drop in the value ofthe dollar 10 Harding (1997) l This point is made by Kenen (1993) page 265.
ii relative to the euro. Such a shift should also raise interest rates on U.S. government securities since, as noted above, most reserves are held in government securities. In contrast, the euro would temporarily rise in value and interest rate in the EMU countries would drop. However, the general consensus is that any shift in reserves from dollars to euros is likely to occur gradually.' 2 As noted above, it is likely that the need for reserves on the part of the EMU member countries will decline following the pooling of reserves. While estimates of excess reserves in the European Union as a result of monetary union vary, these countries are not likely to dump these reserves in currency markets. It is even possible that the EMU countries will want to maintain a large stock ofreserves for several years following the creation of the euro to respond to a possible currency crisis.
A gradual shift in international reserves toward the euro is unlikely to have much effect on the United States or the European Union. Because nearly all international reserves are invested in government securities, the reserve currency country does not gain any seignorage benefits. The most important benefit is the possibility that reserve currency status lowers the interest rate at which the government can borrow. Thus, it is argued that Europe will benefit through a reduction in the interest rate at which governments can borrow while the U.S. government will see its borrowing costs rise.
A negative interest rate effect on the U.S. would require not simply a rise in the share of reserves held in euros but an absolute decline in holdings ofdollar reserves. Given the trends in the growth of worldwide reserves, the latter change will take longer (if ever) to occur than the former. In addition, the extent of the interest rate benefit to a reserve currency is not well- 12 One writer who has argued that the shift may be immediate is Bergsten (1997) .
established. Blinder (1996) is skeptical of the importance of such a link. He argues that if such a benefit were significant then there should be a larger difference between interest rates on government and corporate bonds in the U.S. then in other major countries, yet finds no evidence to support this argument.
Intervention Currency A corollary to the dollar's role as the primary international reserve currency is its use as the main currency for intervening in foreign exchange markets. This latter role is also aided by the use of the dollar as a vehicle currency and by the liquidity of the U.S. bond market, as discussed later in this paper. Although data on interventions are limited, it is believed that nearly all intervention in the currencies markets, with the exception of those undertaken by the United States, takes place in dollars. Another exception is within the ERM, where mandatory intervention must take place in the EMS currencies.' 3 However, even here the dollar is often used for intra-band interventions. 14 The most important determinants of the choice of intervention currency are liquidity and acceptability. In countries that peg their exchange rate, the currency peg will determine the intervention currency. Since countr:~sprefer to hold their reserves in the form of interestearning assets the liquidity of these assets is extremely important. The relative illiquidity of the 13 Intervention is mandatory when a currency reaches the limits of its exchange rate bands. However, intervention often occurs before a currency reaches the limit.
'~' Giavazzi (1989) provides some evidence on the use ofthe dollar as an intervention currency in the ERM in the 1980s.
German and Japanese bond markets, gives the dollar an advantage over the use of these two currencies.T he acceptability of an international currency is related to its role as a medium of exchange for private transactions. The more frequently a currency is used for private transactions the larger is th~• exchange market for that currency, which increases the ease with which a country can use the currency for intervention purposes.
The Private Uses of an International Currency

Invoice Currency
The dollar is the predominant international currency that serves a unit of account function for private transactions. The U.S. dollar is used as the invoice currency for roughly 48 percent of world exports, as shown in Table 5 . The Deutsche mark is the invoice currency for approximately 15 percent of world exports, with the yen's share far behind at 5 percent. In fact, the French franc and the pound sterling are more often used to invoice trade than is the yen.
The share of the U.S. dollar as an invoice currency far surpasses the share of any other currency. However, the combined share of the 5 major currencies of the European Union, at 34 perce~, does come closer to that of the dollar. Nevertheless, there is a clear distinction between the use of the dollar and other invoice currencies. Nearly all international trade that is not invoiced in the currency ofone of the two trading partners is invoiced in U.S. dollars. Roughlỹ
The existence of swap arrangements between central banks can offset some these liquidity problems. 17 Blinder (1996) , page 132.
18 See for example Grassman (1973) , Page (1981) and Black (1990). choice. Only rarely is a third country's currency used. Trade between industrial and developing countries is generally priced in the currency of the industrial country or that of a third country.
Trade between developing countries is often priced in the currency of a third country. When a third country's currency is used for invoicing trade, the U.S. dollar is the most likely choice. The limited use ofdeveloping countries' currencies in world trade arose in part because many of these countries restricted (and some continue to restrict) the convertibility of their currencies.
Trade in primarycommodities is almost always invoiced in U.S. dollars since these products are priced in dollars on international exchanges.
Another factor in the choice of an invoice currency is the expected stability of the currency. The share of a country's exports denominated in its domestic currency declines the greater is the expected depreciation of its currency.' 9 Thus the currencies of countries plagued by inflation are seldom used in international trade.
The creation of the euro should foster its use as an invoice currency. Replacing as many as 15 currencies with a single currency reduces the transaction costs involved in currency exchanges. 2°T he reduction in transactions costs will facilitate the use of the euro by the smaller EMU member countries who are more likely to currently invoice their exports to the U.S. in dollars. In intra-European Union trade the use of the dollar is negligible and so the cre~ion of the euro will have no noticeable effect. 2 '
' 9 See Black (1990) pages 185-86.
It is not obvious, however, that trade involving neither the E.U. nor the U.S. that is currently invoiced in dollars will be invoiced in euros following the EMU. Nor does it follow that the pricing of internationally traded commodities will shift from dollars to euros, at least not in the near term. The location of major commodity exchanges in the United States, while not a necessary requirement for dollar pricing, does increase the likelihood that these commodities will continue to be priced in dollars. While it is possible that an integrated Europe will develop commodity exchanges to rival those of the U.S. such a shift is likely to be gradual. Most importantly, any shift in pricing of these commodities is unlikely to occur until the stability of A switch from dollar to euro invoicing in international trade not involving the U.S. or the EMU countries will have no effect on either. Thus, a shift in international commodity pricing 22 See Menon (1995) for a recent survey of pass-through studies. from dollars to euros will affect the U.S. only to the extent that it increases the exposure of U.S.
importers to exchange rate risk. The effect on the EMU countries will occur to the extent that exchange rate risk is reduced. These effects depend on the extent to which commodity prices are less volatile in dollars than in European currencies. Emerson et al (1992) states that in the medium to long-run the currency denomination of oil prices does not affect the real price ofoil.
However, they argue that because ofdifferences in short-run volatility there may be advantages to the European Union from having oil priced in euros.
The idea that the currency denomination of oil prices does not affect the real domestic currency price ofoil over time is supported by an examination of the data for the United States and Germany. The argument that the real price of oil in Deutsche marks (or any non-dollar currency) is more volatile than the real price of oil in dollars is based on the idea that exchange rate fluctuations add another source of variability to the price. That is, the real price of oil in the U.S. depends on the dollar price of oil in international markets and the U.S. inflation rate while the real price of oil in Germany depends on the dollar price of oil in international markets, the mark/dollar exchange rate and the German inflation rate. The evidence, however, indicates that there is a negative covariance between the exchange rate and the inflation rate which over time eliminates any increased variability from the exchange rate. The variances of the monthly real price of oil in dollars and in Deutsche marks over the period January 1985 through August 1997 were virtually identical. 23 Thus, a shift in oil pricing in international markets from dollars to euros will not reduce the variability of the real price of oil in European markets.
Financial Assets
In international financial markets the dollar is the currency of choice, although once again currency diversification is rising. In the 1950s over three-quarters ofthe funds raised on financial markets were denominated in dollars, as shown in Table 6 . The pound sterling was the second most pdpular currency, accounting for 8 percent of international capital market issues, and nearly 70 percent of the funds raised in the currencies of the currentEuropean Union members. The Swiss franc was the third most popular currency, accounting for7 percent of international capital market issues. Almost 94 percent of the funds raised on international capital markets were denominated in these three currencies. The yen was not used at all in international financial markets in the l950s and only 2 percent of funds raised in international markets were in Deutsche marks. In the 1990s half the funds raised on international financial markets were denominated in dollars and 30 percent were denominated in European Union currencies with the Deutsche mark being used only slightly more often than the pound. The yen's share rose to 10 percent while the share of the Swiss franc fell to 4 percent. Table 7 provides information on the use of currencies in international bond markets. In these markets the share of the dollar has declined by half since the l950s while the share of the yen and the European Union currencies have risen substantially. Nonetheless, with the exception of the rise in the use of the yen, the trends have not been smooth, In foreign bond issues, the use ofthe Swiss franc has grown to rival the use of the dollar.
In the l980s the Swiss franc was clearly the currency of choice for foreign bond issues, with its sharing being more than double that of the dollar. The share of the European Union currencies peaked in the l960s. The decline in the use of the mark since the l960s is particularly noteworthy. So far this decade, no foreign bonds have been issued in Deutsche marks.
In the Euro-bond market it is the European Union currencies that currently rival the dollar. While the dollar has historically held the major share of this market, in the l990s its share is slightly below that of the E.U. currencies. The mark currently accounts for slightly more than one-third of the combined share of the European Union currencies, but its importance is declining as a result of a sharp increase in French franc Euro-bond issues (the franc's share in the E.U. currencies rose from 5 percent in the l980s tc' 18 percent in the 1990s) and the entry into the Euro-bond market of the lesser E.U. currencies. The Swiss franc is rarely used in Euro-bond issues in contrast to its strong presence in the foreign bond market.
In contrast to the trends in international bond markets, the dollar remains the clear currency of choice in the syndicated loans market, as Table 8 indicates. The share of the Japanese yen rose to nearly 7 percent in the l980s but has fallen to less than 1 percent in the 1990s. Neither the Swiss franc nor the Deutsche mark are used frequently in international syndicated bank lending. The pound is the predominant European currency used in syndicated lending. In other bank facilities the dollar dominance is most obvious. As shown in Table 9 , 91 percent of these debt facilities are made in dollars. The pound is the only other currency that plays a significant role in this market, accounting for4 percent of total issues and two-thirds of the issues in European currencies. 
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Pound sterling The decline in the dollar's dominance in world capital markets, reflected in these tables, is a result of the emergence of other strong economies that in conjunction with the liberalization and deregulation of financial systems worldwide has increased the attractiveness of assets denominated in other currencies. This is particularly evident in the bond markets where there has been a rapid increase in the number of currencies used.
The use of a country's currency in international capital markets is determined by the size, openness and liquidity of that country's financial markets and the stability of its currency. All but the last of these factors favor the U.S. dollar over the Japanese yen and European currencies. With the establishment of a single currency in the European Union the value of private assets denominated in euros will rival the size of the U.S. capital market. 24 However, the creation ofthe euro alone will not ensure that this market becomes integrated or more liquid.
The creation of the euro will increase the range of assets in the European Union that are denominated in a single currency. This in"~ease in the depth of the European financial market should increase its attractiveness to international investors. The establishment of a common 24 If all the European Union countriesjoin the EMU the size of the European capital market will exceed the U.S. capital market. According to Prati and Schinasi (1997) , the market value of equities, bonds and bank assets issued by E.U. countries as of the end of 1995 was $27 trillion while the market value ofcomparable U.S. issued assets was $23 trillion.. system for settling inter-bank payments should aid in the development of a more liquid market further increasing its attractiveness.
The establishment ofthe euro will also reduce barriers to cross border investment among the members of the monetary union. For example, insurance companies and some pension funds within the Eurtypean Union are restricted in their ability to issue international debt. Liabilities in a foreign currency must be 80 percent matched by assets in that same currency. With the creation of the euro this matching rule will be irrelevant for intra-EMU investments.
Despite these boosts for a more integrated, liquid and thick capital market from the creation of the euro, there will remain limitations on the European capital market. Currently, as Prati and Schinasi (1997) note, the European markets fordebt and equity securities retain distinctly national orientations. The establishment of a single currency will not end these distinctions. Furthermore, while some writers note that the government bond market in a fullmembership EMU will equal the size of the U.S. government bond market, there is a key distinction. In the U.S. there is a single issuer --the U.S. Treasury. The European government bond market under EMU will be more similar to the bond markets for the U.S. states, both in terms of the existence of risk difference among issuers and the lack of a wholly integrated market.
In the United States, the Federal Reserve also plays a role in promoting the liquidity of the government bond market. Prati and Schinasi (1997) argue that the use of open market operations as the primary tool of monetary policy by the Federal Reserve "has fostered the development of efficient money and securities markets in the United States." Whereas, the infrequent interventions by European central banks in securities markets "has tended to discourage the development ofprivate securities markets and foster the predominance of bank-intermediated finance." 25 The extent to which this occurs in Europe depends on the still to be finalized operating procedures of the European Central Bank. The current proposal, however, does not differ much from the current operating procedures of the major European central banks. 26
The eurb will provide an opportunity for the development of a European capital market to rival the advantages of the U.S. market, but it does not guarantee the creation of such a market.
The movement to a common currencyshould give an initial boost to European capital markets but it is not likely to cause significant shifts in the currency composition of private portfolios.
Given the uncertainty likely to surround the euro in its early years, it is even possible that there may be an initial shift of private portfolios away from euros toward the dollar or other non-EMU European asset markets, such as Switzerland. 27
Vehicle Currency Currently, the dollar is by far the primary international medium of exchange. While there is no direct data on vehicle currencies, this information can be gleaned from the shares of currencies in all foreign exchange transactions. As shown in Table 10 In the spot market, the total share of the European Union currencies exceeds that of the dollar. However, much of this activity involves intra-E.U. currency trades which will disappear after the creation of the euro. In the forward and swap markets the E.U. currencies are used less frequently than the dollar, but maintain an notable presence.
The The extent of liquidity in asset markets also affects the development of a vehicle currency. Banks, like countries, prefer to hold most of their foreign currencies in the form of interest-earning assets rather than cash. The liquidity of these assets is a key determinant of the transactions costs involved in switching from one currency to another. Liquidity is determined
The use of transactions cost theory to explain the rise of a vehicle currency was developed by Krugman (1980) and Chrystal (1984) .
not simply by the size of a country's capital markets but by the depth of its markets, i.e. the extent to which secondary markets operate.
The prospects ofthe euro becoming an important vehicle currency thus depend primarily on the transactions costs associated with euro exchanges. Clearly the size of the euro market relative to the markets for individual E.U. currencies will result in lower relative transactions costs forthe euro. These transactions costs will also depend on the extent to which the euro is adopted as an invoice currency, a reserve currency, and its use in international capital markets.
Since any changes in these uses are expected to occur gradually, the use of the euro as a vehicle currency should also occur gradually.
Initially the development of the euro is apt to increase the use of the dollar as a vehicle currency regardless of the policy environment surrounding the euro's development. This is because the euro will eliminate intra-EMU trading. Table 11 looks at the use of currencies in foreign exchange market transactions excluding the transactions between the Deutsche mark and other European Union currencies (including ecus). Although data on intra-European currency transactions not involving the Deutsche mark are not available, the numbers in Table 11 provide a rough estimate of the initial effects of the creation ofthe euro on currency trades. The shares of the European currencies fall while those of the dollar and the yen rise, most notably in the spot market. Accounting for all intra-E.U. currency trades will further raise the shares of the dollar and the yen. The euro, however, will be the second most frequently traded currency with a share well above that of the yen.
Unless markets become highly segmented, as argued by those who foresee the development of a bipolar (euro/dollar) or tripolar (euro/dollar/yen) world, the transactions costs from the use of a primary vehicle currency, rather than competing vehicle currencies, are likely to be lowest. It is more likely that a period of multiple vehicle currencies would give way to a new primary vehicle currency, much the same way as the dollar superseded the pound as the primary vehicle currency. Such an change, however, will not come about simply becauseof the creation ofa single currency, or even because of the further integration of European capital markets.
Thus, while in the medium-term the useof the euro as a vehicle currency should surpass the current usage of individual E.U. currencies, the euro is not expected to supplant the dollar as the primary vehicle currency. 
Category US dollar
Substitution Currency
Another role that an international currency may play is a substitute for domestic currency transactions. Uncertainty surrounding the purchasing power of a domestic currency can lead to the use of a foreign currency as a unit of account, store of value and medium of exchange in the The use of the dollar as a substitute currency provides a direct benefit to the Untied States through seignorage earnings. Figure 2 provides a rough estimate of the real seignorage earned by the U.S. as a result offoreign holdings of U.S. currency during the period l973-l996.~Ĩn real terms seignorage revenues have averaged $6.9 billion over the 24 year period.
The seignorage benefits must be weighed against the problems the foreign holdings of currency create for monetary policy. As Porter and Jw"on (1996) note if foreign demand for a country's currency is unrelated to domestic demand, then the interpretation of movements in monetary aggregates becomes more difficult. While the persistence of hyperinflation and 32 Porter and Judson (1996) . These data are solely for cash and exclude dollar or Deutsche mark denominated assets or demand deposits held abroad.
These seignorage revenues are estimated using the interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills and adjusting nominal revenues using the GDP deflator. political instability throughout the world has sustained the use of the dollar as a substitute currency, foreign demand is difficult to predict.
The euro is not likely to rapidly replace the dollar as the substitute currency of choice. In fact, the use ofthe euro as a substitute currency is likely to lag behind its use as an international currency. Foreign holders of a substitute currency want a stable, secure currency. Uncertainty surrounding the euro and indeed the monetary union itself will limit the attractiveness of the euro. Furthermore, given the monetary control problems caused by the use of a currency outside its borders, the new European Central Bank may be reluctant to promote the use of the euro as a substitute currency in the early years ofthe monetary union.
In the medium to long-term, however, the euro is the natural substitute currency for use throughout Europe. It may also become used more frequently in the Middle East but the euro is not likely to replace the dollar as the substitute currency in Latin America. The use of the euro as a substitute currency will raise the seignorage earnings of the ECB.
It is difficult to predict how large these revenues might be as they depend on the world demand for substitute currencies, the shares of the euro and the dollar, and interest rate conditions. Emerson et al (1992) estimated that these seignorage revenues would at most amount to $2.5 billion a year for the ECB.
The effect on the seignorage revenues of the Federal Reserve also depend on the three factors mentioned above. Ifthe world demand forsubstitute currencies rises seignorage revenues for both the European and U.S. central banks could rise. The unpredictability of the demand for a substitute currency makes it difficult to count on seignorage from these earnings as a source of revenue.
Conclusion
The use of a country's currency as an international currency is determined by the size and openness of its economy and financial markets as well as its macroeconomic policy environment.
A low inflationary environment promotes high growth and a stable currency. In the post-war period these factors have favored the use of the U.S. dollar as the predominant international currency. The emergence of other strong economies, particularly Germany and Japan, however, has reduced the dominance of the dollar. The dollar may still be the currency of choice in international markets but it is not the only choice.
The impending creation of the euro as the single currency for the European Union will have a certain effect on international markets. If the euro is adopted by all fifteen members of the European Union it will serve an economy nearly as large as the United States, with a European Central Bank committed to maintaining a low inflation environment.
Initially, however, the emergence of the euro is likely to increase the dollar's role in international markets. First, from an accounting viewpoint, the replacement of the currencies of the European Union with a single currency will eliminate the use of these currencies as foreign reserves forthe members of the monetary union and will eliminate foreign currency transactions in intra-E.U. currencies. The former will raise the dollar's share in international reserves and the latter will raise the dollar's share of foreign currency transactions. Second, uncertainty surrounding the euro will favor the use of the dollar in international markets. The policies of the European governments and the European central bank are the most important factors in determining the extent ofthis uncertainty. Concerns about the attachment of European governments and the public to monetary union will undermine the use of the euro in international markets. A monetary union fraught with conflict will be detrimental to the use of the euro.
The use of the euro as an international currency, and indeed the rate at which the euro becomes adopted for international transactions will also be affected by the decision of the United Kingdom to join or opt-out of monetary union. The international role of the pound sterling has diminished in the post-warera but the pound is still a key currency in private financial market transactions. Furthermore, the role of London as a major financial center will provide benefits to the euro. The inclusion of the U.K. in a mor~tary union should boost the international presence of the euro.
While the short-term outlook for the euro is uncertain in the medium to long-term its use as an international currency will surely increase. One factin determining the long-run use of the euro is the development of a highly integrated, liquid European financial market. This will not only increase the use of the euro for private financial transactions but also aid its use as a reserve currency and even as a vehicle currency.
Nevertheless, the decline in the dollar's share and the rise is in the euro's share in international transactions is likely to occur gradually. In part this is because the more often a currency is used in international transactions the lower are the costs associated with using that currency and hence the more attractive is the currency for conducting international exchanges.
Thus, there is much inertia in the choice of an international currency.
The ultimate determinants of the continued use of the dollar as an international currency are the economic policies and conditions in the United States. As the Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, Larry Summers noted "In the end, the dollar's relative standing in the international financial system will always depend more on developments here than on events overseas." 34 In the absence of an economic crisis in the United States, the dollar is not likely to lose its standing as the most popular international currency.
Any shifts in the roles of the dollar and euro will affect both the Untied States and the European Union. The extent to which a country benefits from having its currency used internationally is not clear. The use of a currency for invoicing may reduce the costs bone by that country's importers, although these costs may be small at best. The use of a currency as a reserve currency may reduce the borrowing costs of that country's government, but again the extent of this benefit is not known. The use of a currency as a substitute currencydoes provide seignorage benefits but also complicates monetary policy.
As long as the shift in the international role of the dollar is gradual the U.S. is unlikely to be negatively affected. Moreover, the creation ofa monetary union in Europe has the potential to produce benefits to both the United States and the European Union which could far outweigh thẽ Summers (1997) .
effects of shifts in international currency holdings. Developments in European financial markets alone should increase the investment options available to consumers as well as reduce the costs of borrowing for businesses. These developments will benefit those on both sides of the Atlantic. 
